On Faith: Buber, Rosenweig, Levinas, Putnam

been thinking about this alot lately...

Putnam’s Experiential Philosophy: A New Use for Faith
Throughout the history of religion, philosophers and theologians interpret the act of faith as a kind of metaphysical reflection. From this view, the concept of faith pertains to a divine connection: by committing ourselves to a higher being, we pursue an ultimate meaning beyond the scope of human reality. In his recent collection of essays entitled Jewish Philosophy as a Guide to Life, Hillary Putnam identifies commonalties between this traditional conception of faith and its use in what he calls experiential philosophy. Although the new approach retains a commitment or devotion to a religious ideal, it avoids theorizing a mode of operation outside the way it is expressed in human relations. From his own encounter with Judaism and reconciliation of the Jewish philosophers, Rosenzweig, Buber, Levinas, and Wittgenstein, Putnam discovers that the value of faith comes from its expression in human experience and the justification of its meaning through communal practice.
To convey the essentiality of an “experiential philosophy,” Putnam must first argue why we cannot utilize the act of faith as a bridge to the metaphysical realm. This requires adopting Ludwig Wittgenstein’s stance as an “anti-philosopher” and relating the discussion of religion to Wittgenstein’s remarks about the possibility of language. According to Wittgenstein, words only gain their meaning in the context of some human activity; or the expression of their use in what he terms a “language game”. To summarize the connection Putnam sees between language games and faith: the “stream of life” is the language game where our words come to gain meaning and the attribution of meaning to words is determined by a community’s agreement on the correct practices of their use (29). Therefore, to take an “imaginary [metaphysical] position outside the demands of life and flow of time” would be nonsense; it would be analogous to taking a position that exists outside the grammatical rules of language (29). Therefore, the language of faith must exist in a realm we can experience; its grammatical form develops from its practical use.
Additionally, Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language calls for an abandonment of the traditional philosophical belief that there is an “essence,” or internal truth to the words we use; that these words are true by ostensible definition or “name” alone (21). This is the mistake Putnam believes philosophers make in rationalizing a theory of faith. Some examples of failed proofs of Gods existence include Descartes’ radical theory of mind, Maimonides’ speculative reason, and the phenomenology of either a Husserlian or a Heidegerrian. The concept of God cannot picture a truth outside the expression of its meaning in the language game of metaphysical speculation (or in some larger language game such as religious practice) (107). Putnam connects Rosenweig’s “new thinking” to Wittgestein’s anti-philosophy as a way to usher in what it means to experience faith, rather than use it to access the metaphysical realm. Rosenzweig believes that although we cannot “know” god; we are always in his presence. Thus, what matters is that the actual experience of God gives meaning to the activity we partake in the context of living.
After learning where other philosophies go wrong and where Rosenzweig and Wittgenstein go right, we now enter a transition stage in trying to grasp what Putnam means by “experiential philosophy.” For Putnam, the philosophies of Buber and Levinas aid us through the transition. By associating the experience of faith with “the lived problems of human interlocutors” their philosophies begin to orientate the value of faith to the real. From my understanding of Putnam’s reading, previous conceptions of faith would only account for what Buber classifies as “I-It relations” (62). If I am to interact with another being (even God) in this manner, our relationship is reducible to a series of representational objects in my mind, and nothing of more palpable meaning. Only I have knowledge of the meaning of these objects: they constitute some kind of internal truth in themselves that is not available to the other I encounter. Buber’s “I-You” relationship allows for a different kind of reciprocal experience, where two entities can actually meet in an “organic” existence. Each entity must place more value on the other, than itself. This represents an ideal and naturalistic conception of faith, whereas the divine meeting between two akin and equitable souls has a normative meaning that cannot be reduced to a subjective, empirical composition. Putnam notes that by engaging in this kind of relation (which is not only applicable to an encounter with God, but all aspects of life) I am actually “transforming life in the world” (64); rather than picture the meaning of an entity through some kind of objectification; I come to understand its meaning through its expression, alone. Similarly, Levinas prescribes a “fundamental obligation to the neediness of another person” that grounds the same kind of non-reducible relation. The fundamental obligation is “asymmetrical;” I cannot succeed in grasping the “alteriority” or the fundamental otherness of another (105). Therefore, there is no metaphysical sameness between myself and anything else in relation to me and I cannot know whether a divine commandment from God is true (105). It follows that ethical judgments supplant ontology as the real philosophy at work in our experience; ontology cannot describe either the “Infinite or the others alteriority” (105). The act of faith requires that I help others and fulfill a role their language game, or else they will not be able to recognize me, in solidarity, as a participant. I must value my relationship with the people of my life in the terrestrial realm, more than anything else in the cosmos; this premise instantiates the omnipotence of human ethics.
If we incorporate the ideas of Buber and Levinas into a pragmatics (corresponding to the Dewey interpretation), we can finally identify Putnam’s position on faith. Faith is a kind of deliberative democracy; in other words, it’s an ethical connection with a standard of correctness that “seems to be the most intelligent way to solve problems” (Pragmatism and Realism, 42). As the pragmatist Jurgen Habermas would argue, language contains innate and universal concepts that necessitate the existence of an ethical common ground. The learning of commonalities in the quotidian life endeavors of communicative interlocutors allows for the eradication of nihilism and the buttressing of an essential belief system for the community. The “experience” of God is only valuable if the community adopts God as an objective ideal (free from any kind of metaphysical meaning) from which we can form the basis of our ethical judgments. Because the standard of correctness constantly evolves through our discursive and religious practice, it will continue to reflect the accepted norms of the community. Faith is helpful in determining an acceptable way for us to act; in practicing Judaism, Putnam is able to engage in meaningful relations with other human beings. For this reason, I believe Putnam can make stronger claims about the pragmatic value of “praying, meditating, putting [himself] in touch with the ideals,” than he could if he relied on some kind abstract “philosophical” conception of normativity.
In evaluating Putnam’s “experiential philosophy,” I ask, why Judaism? Can one understand a new conception of faith through other religious practices? Perhaps in comparison, Christianity places greater emphasis on the afterlife and thus misses out on the “lived problems” identified in the book (106)? Furthermore, do Putnam’s essays stand as a validation of Judaism as more practical than other religions? Does he even want to make an attribution of value, here? Rather than answer these questions, I believe Putnam would sidestep them all together. He may remark that Judaism is no more valid a discourse than any other method for examining the “new way” of thinking. Rather, Putnam wants to relate how his encounter with Judaism had a personal affect on him, how it allowed for him to question and change his views on life, and nothing more dogmatic. It seems that any religious ideal can do the same, as long it exists in a stable, unified language game, where its meaning can be expressed at the public level. Although Judaism allowed Putnam to understand what it means to partake in experiential philosophy, there are other ways to do so and we do not necessarily have to go about it in the same manner that he did. Therefore, to ask if there is a specific reason for his choosing to focus on Judaism in his discussion, is missing the point all together. This digression makes the same mistake as traditional philosophers who try to extricate one kind of epistemological knowledge or metaphysical meaning for faith, rather than a multiplicity of meanings clarified through the everyday practice of living. Faith has no value outside of its expression or use in the grammatical rules of language. We can develop our own meaning for faith based on our own communal practice; after all, all meaning is grounded in the reality of human relationships.

-Mike Kober 11/26/2008